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“Hong Kong will not be ready for universal suf-frage until around 2022 because its peoplelack a sense of national identity((1)”. This dec-
laration by Ma Lik, chairman of the pro-Beijing Democratic
Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong,
shows how the question of national identity is so central to
political debate in Hong Kong that it sets the terms for the
territory’s democratic development, even though this is al-
ready laid down in the Basic Law.
Since 1997 the authorities have frequently denounced what
they see as “foreign” in the political culture of the former
colony. For example, in 2002 the Chief Executive Tung
Chee-hwa stated his desire to change it, when he attacked
Martin Lee for criticising his leadership((2): “Our culture is
changing. It is in nobody’s interest to continually badmouth
Hong Kong((3).” In the same vein, the Beijing leadership has
constantly reiterated over the last ten years that the Hong
Kong population ought to display more patriotism (which in
Chinese communist-speak means supporting the Party).
That is why, in their eagerness to please the central govern-
ment, the SAR authorities decided to have the national an-
them played regularly on the television.
National identity is unquestionably an important element in
a political culture, but, when analysing this concept in its
context, it is useful to explore how the people of Hong Kong
themselves see their identity. Regular surveys have been
conducted to throw light on the SAR’s inhabitants’ attitudes,
and they reveal a contrasted image. Experts in this area have
agreed on a definition of four different kinds of identity: two
place the emphasis on membership of the SAR, namely
“Hong Kong citizens” (Heunggong yahn 香港人) and
“Hong Kong citizens of Chinese origin” (Junggwok dik He-
unggong yahn 中国的香港人), while the other two em-
phasise Chinese identity, namely “Chinese” (Junggwok
yahn 中国人) and “Chinese citizens of Hong Kong” (He-
unggong dik Junggwok yahn 香港的中国人).
The survey results show that since 1997 over half the peo-
ple interviewed have opted for one of the first two cate-
gories, which means they attach great importance to the spe-
cial status of Hong Kong. And even though there is a no-
ticeable regular increase in the percentage of inhabitants
who stress their belonging to China, they are still in a minor-
ity. This justifies the approach of this article, which will be
to study those elements which are specific to Hong Kong’s
political culture.The  emergence of  a spec if icHong Kong pol it i cal  culture
Starting in the 1970s, the former British colony saw the de-
velopment of its own political culture, focused on the de-
fence of basic human rights. This underwent continual de-
velopment throughout the 1980s, and the Beijing authorities
certainly made their own contribution by setting up the
Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Basic Law Consul-
tative Committee, to which, for the first time, representa-
tives from the various active sectors of the colony’s popula-
tion were invited to express their opinion on the Territory’s
future. These institutions functioned as a kind of school in
political participation, just like the Legislative Council
(Legco) which had recently admitted elected members. It
can be said therefore that the actions of the Beijing govern-
ment helped to increase local people’s interest in politics,
particularly among the middle classes whose importance was
steadily increasing.
But there can be no doubt that it was the pro- democracy
movement in China which was a watershed in the formation
of the political culture of Hong Kong. When the students
began to demonstrate in the streets of Beijing in April 1989,
there was immediate sympathy on the part of the Hong
Kong population, especially among the youth. And on 20
May, when Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng declared mar-
tial law, the entire population was galvanised. The PRC
regime,  which eight years later was to rule Hong Kong, re-
vealed its brutality. “Beijing’s today is Hong Kong’s tomor-
row” was one of the slogans repeated by the million demon-
strators (out of a population of five million) who took to the
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1. Ambrose Leung, “Furore at DAB’s Chief Tirade,” South China Morning Post, 15 May 2007
2. Lee had accused Tung of turning the SAR into a “sick chicken” (in place of the former
goose that laid the golden eggs).
3. South China Morning Post, 8 February 2002.
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Table 1. The question of identity
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streets on 21 May to protest against the proclamation of mar-
tial law in Beijing. Two weeks later, the 4 June massacre in
Tiananmen Square sounded the death knell for optimism in
Hong Kong, and again a million of its inhabitants took part
in a massive demonstration. Thus, 4 June was a turning
point in the development of political awareness in the Terri-
tory. It gave a major boost to the movement for democracy
in Hong Kong, and was a key moment in the formation of
its political culture.
Contrary to many observers’ expectations, that culture
has continued to develop and strengthen since the han-
dover of the Territory to the motherland. It has been
structured around a number of key dates, principles and
institutions. There is no doubt that it has enabled the
SAR to retain its own special status, despite the hostile
environment exemplified by Beijing’s refusal for any de-
velopment towards democracy to take place, in contraven-
tion of the promises contained in annexes I and II of the
Basic Law((4).
June 4th:  a  watershed
In his declaration deploring Hong Kong people’s lack of a
“sense of national identity”, quoted above, the chairman of
the DAB went on to complain that “many still believe there
was a massacre in Tiananmen Square in 1989.” 
Ma Lik is right to be worried. Every year since 4 June 1990,
whatever the weather, tens of thousands of people have held
a vigil in Victoria Park. Hong Kong people from all walks of
life come in family groups and light candles, as for the mid-
Autumn festival, in memory of the victims of the bullets of
the People’s Liberation Army. They listen to speeches by
Szeto Wah, Chairman of the Alliance in Support of the Pa-
triotic pro-Democracy Movement in China, which was
founded in May 1989, and they watch interviews of the
leaders of the Tiananmen protest movement, or of Ding
4. See the article by Michael Davis in this issue
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People lighting candles in memory 
of the victims of June 4th
Zilin, founder of the Tiananmen mothers’ organisation. They
shout slogans calling for the rehabilitation of the movement,
sing the songs which accompanied the 1989 demonstrations,
and reaffirm their commitment to democracy in Hong Kong.
It is a sort of secular democratic ritual. Despite the passing of
the years, the return of Hong Kong to the motherland, and
the replacement of one Chief Executive by another, the vigil
on 4 June still attracts considerable crowds. This vigil consti-
tutes an essential part of the political culture, and even of the
political identity of Hong Kong. By commemorating those
who gave their lives for democracy in Beijing, they declare
their own commitment to that cause. At the same time, they
express their conviction that only the introduction of democ-
racy will enable the SAR’s identity to be maintained.
However, the authorities are doing everything in their power
to persuade the Hongkongers to give up this tradition. Ten
years ago, Tung Chee-hwa, the Chief Executive appointed
by the mainland authorities, declared just before taking up
office that the population would do well to “abandon the
June 4th baggage” and look to the future. Rumours about
public works in Victoria Park raised fears that the celebra-
tions to mark the ninth anniversary of the massacre could not
take place. Despite such fears, 50,000 people gathered to-
gether on the eve of the first anniversary since the handover,
and for the fifteenth anniversary in 2004, there were 82,000
participants((5). This was the largest gathering since 1997. 
This regular event has an undeniable importance in the po-
litical life of Hong Kong. All the opinion polls show that the
population continues to condemn the massacre carried out
by the People’s Liberation Army eighteen years ago. To the
question “Do you think the Chinese Government did the
right thing in the June 4 Incident?” the number of negative
replies was 63.1% in 1997, and 63.4% in 2006. These fig-
ures reveal a remarkable consistency.
The natural sequel to this condemnation is that the majority
of those questioned believe that the Chinese Government
ought to revise its stand on the movement in Tiananmen
Square. We even find that the proportion of those in favour
of this proposal has increased since 1997, despite the pres-
sures in the dominant discourse to play down the importance
of those events.
Table 2. “Do you think that the Chinese
Government did the right thing in the June 4
Incident?”
Table 3. “Do you support a revision of the
official stand on the 4 June incident?”
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5. Keith Bradsher, “Hong Kong Crowds Mark Tiananmen Square Killings,” International
Herald Tribune, 5 June 2004, and Klaudia Lee, “No longer just a vigil but a fight,” South
China Morning Post, 5 June 2004.
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The importance of 4 June in the political culture is con-
firmed by opinion polls on the attitude of Hong Kong citi-
zens towards the Alliance in Support of the Patriotic pro-
Democracy Movement in China, which has organised the
vigils and activities to support Chinese democrats ever since
its foundation in 1989. Although the authorities hinted that
it might be dissolved after the handover on the grounds that
it was “subversive,” for the last ten years the inhabitants of
the SAR have repeatedly affirmed their commitment to its
continuing existence. Thus, in reply to the question: “Do
you think that the Alliance should be disbanded?,” over
40% replied in the negative (except in 1998, when it was
endlessly denounced by the authorities), whereas positive
replies have never risen above 20%. This shows that a large
majority make a connection between their condemnation of
the 4 June incident and their actual ability to express it in
public demonstrations. That too is an important characteris-
tic of the political culture of the population.
For a large majority of the inhabitants, the condemnation of
the suppression of the 1989 movement entails a number of
consequences, including the particular role of the SAR in
the democratisation of China. So in response to the ques-
tion: “Do you think Hong Kong people have a responsibil-
ity to instigate the development of democracy in China?,”
about 76% replied in the affirmative. This shows that SAR
residents are well aware that their political culture is more
advanced than that on the mainland, and that they believe
it should be extended to cover the whole of China.
These polls show that Ma Lik is quite right to consider atti-
tudes towards the Tiananmen massacre to be a major ele-
ment in the political culture of the SAR which, if it remains
unchanged, will remain very different from that on the main-
land (which he calls the “national identity,” as though Chi-
nese national identity includes a refusal to acknowledge that
a massacre occurred in Beijing in 1989!)The importance  of  demonstrations
The freedom to demonstrate was among the 16 criteria se-
lected by Chris Patten to judge the effective reality of the
“one country, two systems” formula((6). And, from the 1980s
onwards, the number of demonstrations increased through-
out the Territory, becoming a defining characteristic of its
Table 5. “Do you think Hong Kong people
have a responsibility to instigate the devel-
opment of democracy in China?”
Table 4. “Do you think the Alliance should
be disbanded?”
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6. Jean-Philippe Béja, “Un an de politique à Hong Kong: Une divine surprise?”,
Perspectives chinoises, nº 47, May-June 1998, p. 6, and “Policy Address”, SCMP, 3
October 1996.
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political culture. This too is a distinctive feature which marks
the SAR off from the mainland. On the other side of the
Shenzhen River, the right to demonstrate does not exist, al-
though it is guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Since 1 July 1997, there have been about 1,000 demonstra-
tions per year, or about three a day (see tables 6, 7 and 8).
So, contrary to the fears expressed after the provisional Legco
amended the Public Security Act to restrict the right to
demonstrate (by introducing the need to seek authorisation for
marches and by reducing the numbers allowed to congregate
without authorisation from 30 to 20((7)), the number of
demonstrations did not fall but became a regular feature of the
SAR. On the whole, Hong Kong people believe that they
enjoy considerable freedom in this respect. But they also think
the situation could be better since, when asked to evaluate it
on a scale of 0-10, they put it within a range of 6.19 at its low-
est (in the first quarter of 1998) to 7.71 at its highest (in the
first quarter of 1996), while it currently stands at 7.48((8).
The reasons for the demonstrations range widely from wage
demands to heritage preservation, trade union rights, univer-
sal suffrage etc. But the important point is that demonstrat-
ing is considered by all inhabitants, whatever their political
position, to be a natural and legitimate form for expressing
opinions. There are two types of demonstration; the first in-
volving gatherings of several dozen or even hundreds of peo-
ple, usually in front of a government building, aimed at de-
fending sectional interests or protesting against certain meas-
ures taken by the state. These are by far the most numerous,
and their political character is by no means clear. But they
represent a specific characteristic of Hong Kong’s political
culture, and can probably be explained by the large number
of associations which make up its extremely lively civil soci-
ety((9), as well as by the ease in meeting the formal require-
ments to be allowed to demonstrate.
The other type of demonstration is more spectacular, and it
indicates the level of politicisation of the population. This
type consists of a march by tens or even hundreds of thou-
sands of people when they feel their way of life is under
threat. In such cases, neither the SAR government’s urging
of restraint, nor the warnings from the central government,
manage to contain the flood. The clearest example was
doubtlessly the demonstration on 1 July 2003 which at-
tracted over 500,000 people, surprising not only the police
but also the organisers who had expected only 100,000.
The issue was the introduction of legislation aimed at enact-
ing anti-subversion measures. This was viewed as an attempt
to restrict existing freedoms, and therefore calling into ques-
tion the basis of the system established in Hong Kong for sev-
eral decades. The success of this march was all the more sur-
prising as it was organised by a group of lawyers who had only
recently turned to politics, around their Civil Human Rights
Front. That did not prevent the demonstration from taking
place in an atmosphere of impressive calm, which shows that
the population knows how to behave on such occasions. And
just as in 1989, the police did not intervene, showing that
their attitude had not changed over the years since 1997.
Other large-scale demonstrations took place on 1 January
(100,000) and 1 July 2004 (300,000) to demand that the
chairmen of the Executive and Legislative Councils be
elected by universal suffrage and to protest against the re-
fusal by the National People’s Congress to agree to these de-
mands. On these occasions too, although the pro-democracy
parties took part, it should be noted that the associations
from civil society grouped around the Civil Human Rights
Front played an essential role in organising the marches.
The breadth of these demonstrations is all the more striking
since the demonstrators on 1 July knew perfectly well that
their actions would annoy Beijing((10), not just the local gov-
ernment which was taking the side of the central authorities.
But that did not prevent them from participating en masse.
Their response made it clear that Tung Chee-hwa’s and the
Beijing authorities’ statements, to the effect that Hong is a
city whose inhabitants are essentially concerned with the
state of the economy, do not correspond to the reality.
Whenever the way of life and the system of freedoms gov-
7. Linda Choy, Colin Ley, “Talking Liberties”, SCMP, 21 May 2007.
8. Opinion poll with the instruction: “Please use 0-10 to evaluate the extent of freedom of
procession and demonstration in Hong Kong”, HKU pop.site, http://hkupop.hku.hk/
9. See the article by Christine Loh in this issue.
10. A poll conducted among 732 participants in this demonstration revealed that 547 said
that they wished to show their dissatisfaction with recent positions adopted by Beijing.
“Qi.yi 2004 wanshang diaocha yijian tongji” (statistics from the internet survey on the 1
July 2004 demonstration), http://hkupop.hku.hk/http://hkupop.hku.hk/
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erning Hong Kong are threatened, the inhabitants do not
hesitate to take to the streets. This justifies our view that
large demonstrations with political objectives constitute an
important aspect of the political culture of Hong Kong.
We might even risk the hypothesis that it is precisely be-
cause there is no election by universal suffrage to the whole
of the Legislative Council and to the post of Chief Execu-
tive that the demonstrations are so numerous. Given the
constraints imposed by the Basic Law, only those social
forces favourable to Beijing and to business circles can exer-
cise any power. That is why the democrats, who have won
about 60% of the votes in each of the elections by direct suf-
frage which have been held since the handover, can never
take part in the government. Under these circumstances, dis-
senting opinions can never carry the day in governing bod-
ies, so they find an outlet in the streets, putting pressure on
those in power who are thus obliged to take it  into account.
In this regard, it must be acknowledged that demonstrations
quite often manage to influence the decisions of the govern-
ment. The case of the demonstration on 1 July 2003 is a
good example of this. At the end of July, James Tien, the
leader of the Liberal Party and a member of the Executive
Council, resigned in protest against Tung Chee-hwa’s refusal
to withdraw the proposal to incorporate Article 23 into the
legislation((11). By 5 September, however, Tung eventually
withdrew it, saying “I think that we need to re-examine the
whole issue.” He told reporters at a hastily scheduled news
conference in Hong Kong, “We will want to consult very
widely in the community again, and until there is sufficient
consultation and support, we are not going ahead [with the
bill]((12).” By taking this step, the Chief Executive was recog-
nising the legitimacy of the demonstration. The success of
the march on 1 July 2004 against Beijing’s refusal to intro-
duce universal suffrage also had important consequences. In
February 2005, the central government allowed Tung Chee-
hwa to retire “for health reasons,” thereby acknowledging
that he no longer possessed sufficient legitimacy to remain
in his post. He was replaced by Donald Tsang, who was at
the time government Secretary and a leading member of the
former colonial administration, and who enjoyed far greater
popular support. So the experiences of the last decade show
that demonstrations are effective means for the citizens to
exert influence over the political development of the SAR.
They are currently a major element in its political culture.The commitment  to  democracyand e lectoral  part ic ipation
Although the citizens of Hong Kong take every opportunity
to call for the introduction of complete democracy, they at-
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11. James Tien in Letter to Hong Kong, RTHK Radio 3, 27 July 2003.
12. Philip Pan, “Hong Kong Chief Drops Unpopular Security Bill”, Washington Post, 6
September 2003.
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Tables 6, 7 and 8
tach great importance to participation in the current political
institutions. This is another important aspect of the SAR’s
political culture. Regular public opinion polls have shown
that Hong Kong people are not satisfied with the level of
democracy in the SAR, and believe this has worsened since
the handover. On the eve of the fateful date in June 1997,
the level of positive assessment on a scale from 0 to 10 was
6.7. Since then it has never been that high. The highest
point over the last decade was 6.45 in March 1999 (6.08 in
February 2007), and the lowest was 5.59 in July 2003((13). 
In spite of this poor result (or perhaps because of it), Hong
Kong people show great interest in political campaigns and
debates. For example, in March 2007 the two debates be-
tween Alan Leong, a member of the Civic Party, and the in-
cumbent Donald Tsang for election to the post of Chief Ex-
ecutive, were both followed by a television audience of two
million, out of a total population of seven million((14). Even
though there could be no doubt about the outcome, since
Alan Leong could get no more than 132 votes out of the
800 on the electoral commission, it gave the democrats the
opportunity to question the Chief Executive and to oblige
him to defend his record and his future plans. He was
brought down from his pedestal and made to justify himself
before his fellow citizens, even if the latter were not his elec-
tors. That was certainly a step forward in Hong Kong poli-
tics, and the re-elected Chief Executive recognised as much,
writing in his blog after the debate, “There is no question of
who wins or who loses. The result is that we [Mr. Leong
and I] have contributed in different ways to Hong Kong’s
political development((15).” And in fact it is highly likely that,
whatever Beijing may wish, the next election to the post of
Chief Executive will have to be contested, and to include a
debate between the candidates. The interest taken by the
population in these televised debates shows that the SAR’s
political culture is in many ways similar to that of Western
democracies. 
There is another similarity too, namely the numbers partici-
pating in the elections, although these are a relatively recent
phenomenon since the first elections with universal suffrage
only taking place in 1991. These too have become an inte-
gral part of the culture. In the decade since the handover,
the numbers taking part have developed unevenly, from a
record 53.29% in 1998((16) down to 43.6% in 2000((17), and
up to a new peak of 55.6% in 2004((18). It is worth noting
that participation increases with political tensions. In 1998,
just after the handover, being important to show commit-
ment to the elections, residents turned up in large numbers
at polling stations. In 2000, by contrast, there was no press-
ing political problem, the people were demoralised, and vot-
ing numbers were relatively low. But in 2004, one year after
the large demonstration against Article 23 and immediately
after the other large demonstration against the central gov-
ernment’s restrictions on the development of democracy((19),
voters turned up en masse. And this despite violent attacks
by the Beijing authorities, relayed by their Hong Kong
mouthpieces, accusing the democrats of a lack of patriot-
ism((20).
So voter turnout has become an increasingly entrenched fea-
ture of Hong Kong’s political culture. But it has another
noteworthy aspect: since the introduction of universal suf-
frage for the elections to Legco, the candidates from the
pan-democratic camp, who favour universal suffrage and are
keen to maintain the SAR’s autonomy in relation to China,
have always won about 60% of the votes, with a maximum
of 64.7% in 1991, and a minimum of 57.16% in 2000 (and
60.63% in 2004)((21). These figures show that this political
current is supported by a large majority of the population
who are concerned with the defence of the special nature of
the political system, and are in favour of democratisation. 
The concept of direct universal suffrage (as an aspiration, at
least) has become such an integral part of the political cul-
ture of the SAR that in 2004 even those parties represent-
ing business circles, which used to prefer to put forward can-
didates only through the professional functional constituen-
cies, entered some in the geographical constituencies, thus
showing that they too believed that legitimacy based on uni-
versal suffrage was superior to that which is conferred by
small elite groups. The leaders of the Liberal Party, James
Tien and Selina Chow, who had the courage to face the vot-
ers, were actually elected. Similarly, the circles who support
Beijing, despite their hostility to “bourgeois democracy,”
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13. “If you were to use 0-10 to evaluate how democratic a society Hong Kong is, with 10
indicating absolutely democratic, 0 indicating absolutely autocratic, 5 indicating half-
half, how would you rate Hong Kong?”, HKU Popsite, http://hkupop.hku.hk/
14. Edward Cody, “Tsang Re-Elected as Hong Kong’s Leader,” Washington Post, 25 March
2007.
15. Quoted in Denise Hung, “Tsang’s change of tactics puts Leong on the spot in TV elec-
tion debate,” SCMP, 16 March 2007.
16. See Jean-Philippe Béja, art. cit., May-June 1998.
17. Chris Yeung, “Slicing up the Political Pie,” SCMP, 12 September 2000
18. J-Ph. Béja and F. Cini, “Hong Kong en liberté surveillée,” Politique internationale, nº 106,
Winter 2004-2005, p. 343.
19. Christine Loh, “Hong Kong’s Relations with China: the Future of ‘One Country, Two
Systems’,” Social Research, vol. 73, nº 1, Spring 2006, p. 301.
20. China Daily, Hong Kong edition, 5 March 2004.
21. Ma Ngok, “La démocracie dans l’impasse à Hong Kong,” Perspectives chinoises, n˚ 86,
November-December 2004, p. 50.
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have founded a party which regularly puts up candidates in
the geographical constituencies. In the recent elections they
won nine out of the thirty available seats((22), becoming the
leading party in the SAR. Even though these representa-
tives of conservative or pro-Beijing groups continue to claim
that the population is not mature enough to elect its leaders
through direct universal suffrage, they concede legitimacy to
that mode of leadership selection which has now become an
essential element of Hong Kong’s political culture.
The need to put forward candidates for the elections has in-
duced the forces on the ground in the SAR to organise into
parties, but these lack maturity and are not deeply embed-
ded in the political life of the territory. Even the oldest (the
HKUD?Hong Kong Union of Democrats) only goes back
to 1991, and in 1992 the pro-China forces set up the Al-
liance for the Betterment of Hong Kong. This is the party
with the largest membership (9,919 according to official fig-
ures)((23), while the democrats only have 631((24). The pan-
democratic camp has not managed to found a unified organ-
isation, and is still divided into three parties.
However, despite their extremely short history and their in-
experience, the parties play a considerable role in the polit-
ical culture of the SAR. Even if their membership is low,
opinion polls show that the population believes that they are
important, since they enjoy a level of support varying from
48% to 51%((25). Above all they are known to the public.
89% of those interviewed knew about the democrats, 85.1%
about the DAB, and 71.5% about the Civic Party((26), al-
though the latter had only existed for two years when the
poll was conducted. In this respect too, the political culture
of Hong Kong is clearly close to that of other democracies.
This article has been concerned with identifying the specific
features of Kong Kong’s political culture. These have been
sustained and strengthened throughout the decade since the
return of the Territory to the motherland. Ten years of inte-
gration into the PRC have not brought about any deep
changes. On the contrary, the features of Hong Kong’s po-
litical culture have grown stronger. This can be explained by
the fact that on the whole the “one country, two systems”
formula has worked relatively well. The Chinese Communist
Party has not taken over the SAR, the political and legal sys-
tems remain very different from their mainland counterparts,
and Hong Kong enjoys the basic freedoms underwritten by
its independent judiciary. However, the fact that Beijing
plays a major role in decisions concerning the SAR’s devel-
opment has led to the strengthening of certain specific fea-
tures of its political culture. Since the central government
has constantly opposed the introduction of universal suffrage
for elections to leading political positions, the inhabitants of
the SAR have resorted to a large number of demonstrations
in support of their claims. On every occasion, these have
been provoked by the decisions taken by the central govern-
ment, and they have been directed against the government
of Hong Kong. Demonstrations therefore currently consti-
tute a major (and perhaps abnormal?) element in the
SAR’s political culture. Similarly, the vigils held every 4
June to commemorate the repression of democracy in
China, are also a reaffirmation of the specific nature of that
culture. 
In conclusion, as Joseph Man Chan and Francis Lee have
written: “Hong Kong people regard themselves as belonging
to a Chinese cultural community, but they are more reluctant
to regard themselves as belonging to a political community
headed by the Chinese government((27).” •
• Translated by Jonathan Hall
12 N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
22. http://www.dab.org.hk/en/main.jsp?content=category-contentjsp&categoryId=1055
accessed on 22 May 2007.
23. http://www.dab.org.hk/en/main.jsp?content=category-content.jsp&categoryId=1019
24. http://www.dphk.org/2003/basicinfo/index.asp?iCommentID=146
25. “Rating of Top Ten Political Groups,” http://hkupop.hku.hk/
26. Ibid..
27. Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph Man Chan, “Political Attitudes, Political Participation, and
Hong Kong Identities after 1997,” Issues and Studies, vol. 41, n˚ 2, p. 15.
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